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OPINION OF THE COURT 
    
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
In United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2020), 
we established two goalposts concerning the scope of 
resentencings under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.  We first held that a 
district court must consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) anew at resentencing.  Id. at 324.  But we also held 




plenary resentencing hearing at which he would be present.”  
Id. at 326.  This case requires us to explore the space between 
the uprights. 
 
Defendant-appellant James Murphy was convicted of 
two counts of distribution and possession of heroin and 
cocaine, and the District Court sentenced him to the mandatory 
minimum of 360 months’ imprisonment.  This sentence was 
based in part on the quantity of drugs attributed to him and his 
designation as a career offender.  He later sought a sentence 
reduction under the First Step Act, arguing that the District 
Court should reconsider both aspects of his initial sentence.  It 
declined, and Murphy appeals to us. 
 
The District Court correctly refused to reconsider 
Murphy’s attributable drug amounts.  But because Murphy was 
entitled to an accurate calculation of the Guidelines range at 
the time of resentencing, we still need to know whether he 
qualified for the career-offender enhancement based on the law 
as it stood at resentencing.  We therefore vacate his sentence 
and remand for the Court to reconsider it.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2009, a federal jury convicted Murphy on two counts: 
(1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to 
distribute heroin and 50 grams or more of cocaine base,1 under 
 
1 “Cocaine base” is cocaine in its chemically basic form (e.g., 
crack cocaine, coca paste, and freebase), as opposed to cocaine 
hydrochloride (cocaine powder).  DePierre v. United States, 




21 U.S.C. § 846; and (2) distribution and possession with the 
intent to distribute heroin and 50 grams or more of cocaine 
base, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii).  The jury 
specifically found that the weight of the cocaine base 
attributable to Murphy on both counts was 50 grams or more, 
which triggered the highest mandatory minimum sentence at 
the time.  Each count carried a mandatory minimum sentence 
of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum sentence of life.   
 
At sentencing, the Probation Office “conservatively 
estimated” that Murphy was personally responsible for 595 
grams of crack cocaine and 24 grams of heroin.  PSR ¶ 12.  It 
also concluded that Murphy qualified for a career-offender 
enhancement based on prior convictions in Maryland for 
robbery and second-degree assault.  Taking the career-offender 
designation into account, Probation calculated Murphy’s final 
offense level as 37 with a category VI criminal history.  Based 
on that calculation, the applicable Guidelines sentencing range 
was 360 months to life.  The District Court ultimately 
sentenced Murphy to 360 months on each count, to be served 
concurrently, and five years’ supervised release.   
 
In 2019, Murphy moved for resentencing under Section 
404(b) of the First Step Act.  Probation filed an addendum to 
the presentence report (“PSR”) decreasing Murphy’s 
Guidelines sentencing range to 262–327 months, but that 
calculation preserved the previously attributed drug amounts 
and the career-offender designation from Murphy’s initial 
sentencing.  Murphy objected to both the drug amounts and the 
career-offender designation.  As for the former, Murphy 
 
absorbs cocaine base more quickly, thus “producing a shorter, 




argued that the jury had only specifically found that he was 
responsible for 50 grams of cocaine base instead of the 595 
grams in the PSR.  And as to the career-offender designation, 
Murphy contended that his Maryland second-degree assault 
convictions were no longer predicates for career-offender 
status under intervening Fourth Circuit precedent.   
 
The District Court overruled both objections, 
concluding that the First Step Act did not permit 
reconsideration of either factor on resentencing.  However, it 
acknowledged that Murphy would not have qualified for the 
career-offender designation in a de novo sentencing.  Thus, 
although it declined to remove formally the career-offender 
status, the Court varied downward from the Guidelines range 
and sentenced Murphy to 210 months’ imprisonment—the 
high end of the range if the career-offender designation had 
been formally removed.  Murphy now appeals to us. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS2 
As with all First Step Act cases, we start with the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010.  That Act aimed to lessen sentencing 
disparities between convictions involving crack cocaine and 
convictions involving powder cocaine.  United States v. 
Jackson, 964 F.3d 197, 200 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020).  It did this by, 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over the initial criminal 
proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  It had jurisdiction to 
consider Murphy’s request for a sentence reduction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) and Section 404 of the First Step Act 
of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.  We have 





among other things, increasing the amount of crack cocaine 
necessary to trigger higher statutory minimum sentences 
(Section 2) and eliminating mandatory minimums for simple 
possession (Section 3).  Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-220, §§ 2, 3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; see also Dorsey v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264 (2012).  These changes meant 
more sentencing discretion for district court judges. 
 
The First Step Act made certain provisions of the Fair 
Sentencing Act retroactive.  Section 404(b) of the former 
provides that a trial court that has previously sentenced a 
criminal defendant for certain “covered offenses” may, on 
motion of the defendant or others, “impose a reduced sentence 
as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in 
effect at the time the covered offense was committed.”  First 
Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 
5194, 5222.  We recently observed that the Act “does not 
guarantee anyone a lower sentence”—it merely allows “an 
eligible prisoner to ask the court for a shorter one.”  United 
States v. Hart, 983 F.3d 638, 639 (3d Cir. 2020).  Here, the 
Government does not dispute that Murphy was convicted of a 
“covered offense” entitling him to a First Step Act resentencing 
under § 404.  The parties disagree only whether the District 
Court must have reconsidered Murphy’s attributable drug 
amounts and career-offender status during that proceeding. 
 
We have previously said that we typically review the 
denial of a request for sentencing modification under the First 
Step Act for abuse of discretion.  See Easter, 975 F.3d at 322.  
But where, as here, a district court’s decision rests on a pure 
question of law, our review is de novo.  United States v. Birt, 





A.  Attributable Drug Amounts 
Murphy first argues that the District Court should have 
reconsidered the drug quantity attributable to his offenses at 
resentencing.  However, he does not assert that the Court made 
any factual errors for the drug quantity.3  Instead, he contends 
that the jury’s drug-quantity findings are insufficient to support 
his sentence under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 
(2013).4   
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that “[a]ny fact that 
increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be 
submitted to the jury” and found beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id. at 103.  This means that a jury must find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, any drug quantities that increase the 
mandatory minimum punishment.  See Birt, 966 F.3d at 262.  
The jury here found Murphy responsible for 50 grams or more 
of cocaine base, while he was sentenced based on the 595 
grams of cocaine base noted in the PSR.  At the time of his 
 
3 The parties disagree on whether Murphy objected to the drug 
quantity at his initial sentencing, but our conclusion would not 
change even if he had objected. 
4 Murphy also makes several less compelling arguments.  For 
instance, he argues that § 401 of the First Step Act 
contemplates a fresh resentencing based on its legislative 
history.  But he was eligible for resentencing under § 404, not 
§ 401.  And § 401 applies only to offenses that predate the Act 
for which a sentence has not yet been imposed.  See First Step 
Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(c), 132 Stat. 5194, 
5221.  We are not persuaded that the purposes behind § 401 
transpose to § 404, particularly in light of our holding in Easter 





trial, a 50-gram finding triggered the highest possible 
mandatory minimum; however, the Fair Sentencing Act later 
increased that threshold from 50 grams to 280 grams.  See 
Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 269.   
 
At the outset, Murphy does not explain how Alleyne 
changes the outcome in his case, as it appears his conviction 
complied fully with Alleyne under the mandatory minimum 
thresholds in place at that time.  But even assuming he has a 
plausible explanation, it is unpersuasive for at least two 
reasons.  First, in United States v. Jones, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that a resentencing court “is bound by a previous finding 
of drug quantity that could have been used to determine the 
movant’s statutory penalty at the time of sentencing,” 
including findings by a district court instead of a jury.  962 F.3d 
1290, 1303 (11th Cir. 2020).  The Court observed that Alleyne 
requires specific factual findings when those findings increase 
a defendant’s sentence.  Id. at 1303–04; see also Alleyne, 570 
U.S. at 103 (“[A]ny fact that increases the mandatory 
minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury. 
(emphasis added)).  But under the First Step Act a district court 
may only decrease the sentence or leave it as is.  See First Step 
Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (providing that a court 
“may . . . impose a reduced sentence”); see also Jones, 962 
F.3d at 1303.  We are thus persuaded that Alleyne has nothing 
to say about First Step Act proceedings because there is no 
danger that a defendant’s sentence will increase on 
resentencing. 
 
Second, § 404(b) of the First Step Act provides that a 
trial court that has previously sentenced a defendant may, on 
the defendant’s motion, “impose a reduced sentence as if 




at the time the covered offense was committed” (emphasis 
added).  In Easter we interpreted this language to mean that 
First Step Act does not “entitle[]” a defendant “to a plenary 
resentencing hearing at which he would be present.”  975 F.3d 
at 326.  In so doing, we joined the “clear consensus among our 
sister circuits” that a First Step Act resentencing is not a “let’s 
start all over.”  See id. (citing cases from the 5th, 6th, 9th, and 
11th Circuits for this general proposition).  This is because the 
“as if” provision in § 404(b) permits a district court to consider 
only the effect of sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act 
on the defendant’s sentence.  See United States v. Moore, 975 
F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2020).   
 
As we discuss in the following section, a court is still 
“imposing” a sentence, and it must therefore apply the 
§ 3553(a) factors as they stand at the time of resentencing.  
Easter, 975 F.3d at 326 (quoting United States v. Hegwood, 
934 F.3d 414, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2019)).  This new assessment 
must include any new, relevant facts that did not exist, or could 
not reasonably have been known by the parties, at the time of 
the first sentencing (e.g., a defendant’s post-sentencing 
rehabilitation or new health problems).  Id. at 327.  But the 
resentencing court cannot reach beyond those circumstances to 
reconsider the facts as they stood at the initial sentencing.  Such 
an approach would make “as if,” and what follows, in § 404(b) 
superfluous.  Plus, the Easter Court’s holding concerning the 
limited nature of First Step Act proceedings would ring hollow.  
See Easter, 975 F.3d at 326.   
 
We thus join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that a 
district court is “bound by a previous finding of drug quantity 




penalty at the time of sentencing.”5  Jones, 962 F.3d at 1303.  
Hence the District Court in our case did not err by not 
reconsidering Murphy’s previous drug-quantity findings. 
 
B.  Career-Offender Enhancement 
Murphy next argues that the District Court failed to 
reconsider his career-offender designation.  He stresses that, 
after his initial sentencing, the Fourth Circuit determined that 
second-degree assault convictions under Maryland law no 
longer qualify as predicate offenses to support career-offender 
status.6  See United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 342 (4th Cir. 
2013).  Murphy thus contends that the District Court should 
have recalculated the Guidelines range—which would include 
a reconsideration of his career-offender designation in light of 
the Fourth Circuit’s intervening decision—on resentencing. 
 
5 We do not intend to suggest that a resentencing court may 
never revisit a defendant’s attributable drug quantity.  We hold 
only that a resentencing court may not do so if the relevant facts 
are those depended on by the district court at the first 
sentencing. 
6 A defendant is a career offender if: (1) he was at least eighteen 
years old on the date of the current offense; (2) it is “a felony 
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense”; and (3) he has at least two previous felony offenses 
that are either crimes of violence or controlled substance 
offenses.  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 2020).  Murphy’s current offense was a 
controlled-substance crime, and two of his three previous 
offenses for second-degree assault under Maryland law were 
considered crimes of violence at the time of his sentencing.  See 





The Government concedes that Maryland second-
degree assaults no longer count toward a defendant’s career-
offender designation.  It maintains, however, that the District 
Court did not err when it did not reconsider Murphy’s career-
offender status on resentencing.  The text of the First Step Act, 
the Government posits, permits a resentencing court to 
consider only how the Fair Sentencing Act affects the 
defendant’s sentence.  In other words, a district court 
conducting a First Step Act resentencing is limited to 
“considering a single changed variable”—the retroactivity of 
the minimum sentences in sections 2 and 3 of the Fair 
Sentencing Act.  Government’s Br. at 14 (quoting and citing 
United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 2020)). 
 
But, here again, Easter controls.  We considered there 
whether a district court must apply the sentencing factors set 
out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing a reduced sentence 
under the Act.  Easter, 975 F.3d at 320.  Despite our holding 
that the defendant was not entitled to a fresh resentencing 
hearing, we ruled that the court must consider the sentencing 
factors anew.  Id. at 323.  We observed that § 3553(a) requires 
a district court to consider the statutory factors whenever the 
court is “imposing a sentence.”  Id. at 324; see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(a) (providing that a court “impos[ing]” a term of 
imprisonment “shall consider the factors set forth in section 
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable” (emphasis 
added)).  Further, § 404(b) uses nearly identical language to 
describe its resentencing proceedings, as it gives initial 
sentencing courts the power to “impose a reduced sentence” 
under the Fair Sentencing Act.  Easter, 975 F.3d at 324.  We 
thus recognized that the text of the First Step Act does more 




reconsider fully the § 3553(a) factors on resentencing, 
including any relevant facts that did not exist at the first 
sentencing.  Id. at 325–26, 327.  In this context, the 
Government’s position cabins too closely what can be 
considered at resentencing. 
 
In so holding, we again join the Sixth Circuit’s 
conclusion that a resentencing under § 404(b) “includes an 
accurate calculation of the amended guidelines range at the 
time of resentencing and a thorough renewed consideration of 
the § 3553(a) factors.”  Id. at 325–26 (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 784 (6th Cir. 
2020)).  Indeed, one of the § 3553(a) factors is the applicable 
Guidelines sentencing range.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A).  
It stands to reason, then, that a “renewed consideration of the 
§ 3553(a) factors” must include an accurate Guidelines 
calculation “at the time of resentencing.”  See Easter, 975 F.3d 
at 325–26.  In Murphy’s case, this means the District Court had 
to consider whether Murphy qualified as a career offender at 
that time.  
 
This approach aligns with the broader principles of 
federal sentencing that we held applied to § 404 proceedings in 
Easter.  Section § 3553(a) demands that a district court 
“impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, 
to comply with the purposes” set out in § 3553(a)(2).  See 
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 491 (2011).  Those 
purposes include “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,” as well as 
“to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C).  As the Seventh Circuit explained 




range “may reflect updated views about the seriousness of a 
defendant’s offense or criminal history.”  United States v. 
Hudson, 967 F.3d 605, 612 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that a 
district court may resentence a defendant under § 404 “with an 
eye toward current Guidelines” when the Sentencing 
Commission removed the defendant’s burglary convictions 
from the list of predicate offenses for a career-offender 
designation) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Put 
differently, a district court potentially could impose a sentence 
“greater than necessary,” in violation of § 3553(a), if it does 
not accurately calculate the Guidelines range at resentencing.  
And an accurate calculation necessarily includes a correct 
determination of whether the defendant is a career offender at 
that time.7  Cf. United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 90 (D.C. 
 
7 In support of his argument, Murphy also urges us to follow 
the path of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Chambers, 
956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2020).  While our holding appears 
similar to that in Chambers, it rests on different grounds.  The 
Chambers Court held that a district court must reconsider a 
defendant’s career-offender enhancement in a First Step Act 
resentencing, but it emphasized that the intervening case law 
removing the defendant’s career-offender designation was 
retroactive.  See id. at 672–73.  We do not adopt the Chambers 
Court’s approach here, as nothing in the § 3553(a) factors 
supports a distinction between retroactive and non-retroactive 
changes to the applicable Guidelines range.  We similarly do 
not adopt the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. 
Brown, 974 F.3d 1137, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2020), as that 
decision rested on the Court’s view that the intervening law 
“clarifie[d],” rather than “amend[ed],” the career-offender 
provision at issue.  What occurred here is a change in law, not 




Cir. 2020) (endorsing the Seventh Circuit’s view that a district 
court may consider current Guidelines ranges in a § 404 
resentencing); United States v. Harris, 960 F.3d 1103, 1106 
(8th Cir. 2020) (holding that, though a district court is not 
required to apply current Guidelines, “the § 3553(a) factors in 
[a] First Step Act sentencing may include consideration of the 
defendant’s advisory range under the current guidelines”). 
 
We are mindful that several of our sister circuits have 
taken the opposite approach.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 290 (1st Cir. 2021) (holding that “a 
district court may, but need not, consider section 3553 factors” 
in a First Step Act resentencing, including changes to the 
defendant’s Guidelines sentencing range (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Moore, 975 F.3d at 92 (holding that the First 
Step Act “does not obligate a district court to recalculate an 
eligible defendant’s Guidelines range,” including 
reconsideration of a career-offender enhancement); United 
States v. Moore, 963 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2020) (“In the 
First Step Act, Congress does not mandate that district courts 
analyze the section 3553 factors for a permissive reduction in 
sentence.”); United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080, 1089 
(11th Cir. 2020) (holding that a district court “is not free to 
change the defendant’s original guidelines calculations that are 
unaffected by” the Fair Sentencing Act); United States v. 
Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 475–76 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that a 
sentencing court may not “consider other legal changes that 
may have occurred after the defendant committed the offense,” 
including intervening case law that would remove a 
defendant’s career-offender enhancement); United States v. 
Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that the 
First Step Act does not permit district courts to recalculate the 




designation, on resentencing). These decisions largely rest on 
three distinct arguments, none of which persuades us. 
 
First, most other circuits to address this issue have 
adopted the Government’s current argument that the text of the 
First Step Act permits the resentencing court to alter only the 
“single variable” of applying sections 2 and 3 of the Fair 
Sentencing Act retroactively.  Kelley, 962 F.3d at 475; see also 
Moore, 975 F.3d at 91; Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418.  But we 
necessarily rejected this narrow approach in concluding that 
the language in § 404(b) requires district courts to consider 
fresh the § 3553(a) sentencing factors based on the relevant 
post-conviction facts as they stand at the time of resentencing.  
See Easter, 975 F.3d at 325–27.  As we have explained, 
Congress did not “legislat[e] on a blank slate” when it used the 
term “impose” in the First Step Act.  Id. at 324 (quoting United 
States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)).  
While the “as if” language read in isolation may permit only 
the consideration of a single changed variable, Congress did 
not use that provision in a vacuum.  Instead, it chose to pair it 
with a sentencing term of art that already has its own well-
established meaning.  But see Moore, 975 F.3d at 91 
(concluding that “impose” in § 404(b) does not have the same 
meaning as “impose” in § 3553 because Congress used the 
term in the former in conjunction with the “as if” language).  
As with any statute, § 404(b) comes to us as a whole, and we 
do not leave out unchanged meanings long accorded other parts 
of that whole.  See United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 
128, 135 (2007). 
 
Second, at least two of our sister circuits have drawn an 
analogy between First Step Act proceedings and those under 




934 F.3d at 418.  The latter directly authorizes a court to 
“reduce” a defendant’s sentence “based on a sentencing range 
that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  In Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 831 
(2010), the Supreme Court held that a defendant could not seek 
to correct other errors in his sentence under that section beyond 
any changes in the applicable Guidelines ranges.  Our sister 
circuits have applied Dillon by analogy to First Step Act 
proceedings, seizing on the facial similarity between “reduce” 
in § 3582(c)(2) and “impose a reduced sentence” in § 404(b).  
They reason that “congressional authorization to reduce a term 
of imprisonment does not necessarily carry with it 
authorization to correct any errors in the original sentencing 
proceeding.”  Kelley, 962 F.3d at 478. 
 
We agree with this proposition in general—
congressional authorization to reduce a sentence is not 
unbounded.  We must look to the text of the authorizing statute.  
But for us a First Step Act proceeding falls not under 
§ 3582(c)(2), but § 3582(c)(1)(B), which permits a court to 
“modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent 
otherwise expressly permitted by statute . . . .”  See Easter, 975 
F.3d at 323.  That provision looks to other statutes to authorize 
and limit any modification proceedings under it.  See United 
States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting 
that we must “look to the underlying statute” to determine the 
extent of a modification under § 3582(c)(1)(B)).  And in this 
context, the other statute that authorizes and limits 
modifications under § 3582(c)(1)(B) is § 404(b).  Hence the 
relevant statutory text here is § 3582(c)(1)(B) as informed by 





This matters because the language of § 3582(c)(2) —the 
only relevant statutory text in Dillon—differs significantly 
from that of § 3582(c)(1)(B) and § 404(b).  Section 3582(c)(2) 
permits a district court to “reduce” a defendant’s sentence 
based on a changed Guidelines range.  This is a specific, 
limited function.  Indeed, as the Dillon Court noted, the 
Sentencing Commission’s policy statement on subsection 
(c)(2) specifically directs a district court to “leave all other 
guideline application decisions,” besides the changed 
Guidelines range, “unaffected.”  Dillon, 560 U.S. at 831 
(quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10(b)(1)).   
 
But § 3582(c)(1)(B) does not provide any similar 
limitations, providing only that a district court may “modify” a 
previously imposed sentence “to the extent otherwise expressly 
permitted by statute.”  We thus look to § 404(b), which permits 
explicitly a court to “impose a reduced sentence as if section 2 
and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act” applied.  And again, we held 
in Easter that “impose” is a term of art that we assume 
Congress used on purpose.  See 975 F.3d at 324–25.  Thus, 
while “congressional authorization to reduce a term of 
imprisonment does not necessarily carry with it authorization 
to correct” all errors, Kelley, 962 F.3d at 478 (emphasis added), 
the authorization at issue here is broader than that in Dillon.  
Section 404(b) authorizes district courts to take into account, 
at the time of resentencing, any changed circumstances made 
relevant by § 3553(a).  Our take is that the outcome in Dillon 
was “grounded in” the distinct text of § 3582(c)(2) and 
therefore does not control the outcome for § (c)(1)(B).  See 
Chambers, 956 F.3d at 671 (quoting United States v. Wirsing, 






Third, we acknowledge that our interpretation of 
§ 3582(c)(1)(B) allows only a “limited class” of offenders to 
benefit from intervening changes in the law.  Kelley, 962 F.3d 
at 478.  But the First Step Act necessarily singles out this class 
to benefit from subsequent changes in the law, including the 
Fair Sentencing Act, because the class initially “bore the brunt 
of a racially disparate sentencing scheme.”  See White, 984 
F.3d at 91.  And, as the Second Circuit observed, the First Step 
Act aimed to “eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparities.”  
United States v. Davis, 961 F.3d 181, 191 (2d Cir. 2020).  Thus, 
“if it is unfair to afford some pre-Fair Sentencing Act 
defendants a procedural opportunity that is unavailable to 
similar post-Fair Sentencing Act defendants,” it would be 
inconsistent with the First Step Act’s “overarching purposes to 
solve that problem by ‘leveling down’—that is, by withholding 
the opportunity from everyone alike.”  Id.; see also United 
States v. Brown, 974 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir. 2020).  In any 
case, Easter bars this approach by requiring a new Guidelines 
range calculation at resentencing. 
 
We emphasize that nothing in our holding today 
constrains a district court’s discretion to depart or vary from 
the Guidelines range as it sees fit.  See Beckles v. United States, 
137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017) (noting that the Guidelines “merely 
guide the district courts’ discretion”).  As the permissive 
language in § 404(b) indicates, a sentencing court is free to 
consider a defendant’s changed career-offender status and still 
retain his previously imposed sentence.  See Easter, 975 F.3d 
at 327 (noting that § 404(b) permits, but does not require, a 
district court to impose a reduced sentence).  But the court must 
begin from an accurate starting point—the proper Guidelines 
range—in making that determination.  See id. (holding that a 




prescribed to provide assurance that it is making an 
individualized determination” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Finally, some of our sister circuits have assumed that 
any proceeding that permits or requires a district court to 
consider the § 3553(a) factors anew is necessarily a “plenary” 
resentencing in violation of the limiting language in § 404(b).  
See, e.g., Moore, 975 F.3d at 90, 91; Kelley, 962 F.3d at 477; 
Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 415, 418.  But as our twin holdings in 
Easter demonstrate, this is a false dichotomy.  A district court 
may not reach beyond the § 3553(a) factors to reexamine, for 
example, factual disputes that could have been raised at the 
defendant’s initial sentencing.  But the court must make “an 
accurate calculation of the amended guidelines range at the 
time of resentencing,” which includes a fresh inquiry into 
whether the defendant qualifies as a career offender.  See 
Easter, 975 F.3d at 325.  The District Court therefore needed 
to reconsider formally Murphy’s career-offender status.8 
 
C.  Harmless-Error Analysis 
The Government last argues that even if the District 
Court erred in failing to reconsider Murphy’s career-offender 
designation, any error was harmless.  With the career-offender 
designation, Murphy’s Guidelines range was 262–327 months; 
without it, his range would decrease to 168–210 months.  
 
8 We note that, although the Government conceded on appeal 
that Murphy’s second-degree assault charges no longer qualify 
as predicate offenses, we do not reach the ultimate issue of 
whether Murphy still qualifies as a career offender.  We leave 




Although the District Court ruled that it could not formally 
reconsider Murphy’s career-offender designation, it varied 
downward and sentenced Murphy to 210 months “based on 
what [defense counsel] has sort of glibly indicated as a fake 
career offender designation.”  App. at 35.  The Court thus 
sentenced Murphy within the Guidelines range that would have 
applied had he been a career offender. 
 
But an error in this context is harmless only if “it is 
highly probable that the error did not prejudice the defendant.”  
United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  And something is highly 
probable only when “the court possess[es] a sure conviction.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Although the District 
Court technically sentenced Murphy within the Guidelines 
range for non-career offenders, we do not have a sure 
conviction that the career-offender sentencing range failed to 
“affect the sentence actually imposed.”  Id. at 216; see also 
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 
(2016) (“When a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect 
Guidelines range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate 
sentence falls within the correct range—the error itself can, and 
most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability 
of a different outcome absent the error.”).  Thus we cannot say 
the error here was harmless, and we must ask the Court to 
reconsider Murphy’s sentence on remand. 
 
* * * * * 
 Our decision today does no more than navigate the 
goalposts set by our decision in Easter.  On one hand, the First 
Step Act does not permit a district court to conduct a plenary 




this case correctly declined to reconsider a previous drug-
quantity finding.  But, on the other hand, the Act requires a 
court to “impose” a sentence in accord with the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors as they stand at the time of resentencing.  Id. 
at 327.  That means a recalculation that reconsiders Murphy’s 
career-offender designation.  We therefore vacate Murphy’s 
sentence and remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
Sentences are usually final. Congress has the power to 
make exceptions to finality; courts should heed their scope. In 
the First Step Act, Congress authorized district courts to reduce 
sentences “as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010 … were in effect at the time” of the crime. § 404(b). So a 
court must update the Guidelines range to reflect these new 
statutory punishments. On that, my colleagues and I agree. But 
they go further, holding that the resentencing court must also 
update that range to reflect other changes in law. That is more 
than Congress said. 
We are late to the circuit split. All eleven other circuits have 
taken sides in a three-way conflict. Three have held that a dis-
trict court cannot recalculate the defendant’s range from 
scratch; it can only factor in the new statutory punishments. 
Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418–19; Kelley, 962 F.3d at 477–78; 
Denson, 963 F.3d at 1089 (alternative holding). Three have 
held that it must recalculate the range based on current law. See 
Chambers, 956 F.3d at 672, 675; Boulding, 960 F.3d at 784–
85; Brown, 974 F.3d at 1144–45. And five more have said that 
it can consider a fully updated range but need not. Concepcion, 
991 F.3d at 290; Moore, 975 F.3d at 92 & n.36; Hudson, 967 
F.3d at 611–12; White, 984 F.3d at 90 (dictum); Harris, 960 
F.3d at 1106 (same). The Majority joins the second group. But 
the Act directs us to the third. 
2 
I. NO STATUTE REQUIRES REDOING THE  
DEFENDANT’S GUIDELINES RANGE FROM SCRATCH 
A sentence is part of a “final judgment.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(b). So a court can reduce it only as “expressly permitted 
by statute” or rule. § 3582(c)(1)(B). Two statutes, the Majority 
holds, not only expressly permit but require redoing the Guide-
lines range based on current law. But those statutes do not go 
that far.  
The Act lets a sentencing court reduce a drug sentence. To 
do that, the court must calculate the defendant’s sentence “as 
if” the Fair Sentencing Act’s new statutory minima were in 
place at the time of the crime. § 404(b). But that is it. By sin-
gling out one law, Congress did not “invite[ ] the district court 
to apply [other] changes in the law.” Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 
286. The court sits as if it were in the past, updating just one 
variable. Id. at 286, 289. It need not look to other laws passed 
after “the covered offense was committed.” § 404(b). 
In holding otherwise, the Majority and other circuits rest on 
just one statutory word: “impose.” The court “impose[s]” a 
sentence. § 404(b). To do that, the sentencing court must con-
sider the § 3553(a) factors, including the Guidelines range, 
“anew.” Maj. Op. 11; Chambers, 956 F.3d at 672–73. This 
means, my colleagues reason, that the court must apply new 
law and correct errors in the Guidelines range that have popped 
up in the meantime.  
But the statutory sentencing factors imported by the Act do 
not require that. True, the sentencing court must start with the 
defendant’s Guidelines range. § 3553(a)(4). But considering 
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the Guidelines range is not the same as redoing it from scratch. 
The statute says nothing about updating that range at a sentence 
reduction to account for new statutes or cases. It speaks only 
of the Guidelines that “are in effect on the date the defendant 
is sentenced.” § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii). So “impose” cannot bear 
that much weight. 
Seeking more textual footing, the Majority suggests that a 
reduction based on an older Guidelines range might be “greater 
than necessary” to punish the defendant. § 3553(a); Maj. Op. 
12–13. But that textual directive is not about the Guidelines 
range. It is the sentence, not the range, that must be “no[ ] 
greater than necessary” to punish the defendant and protect the 
public. If a range does not reflect a defendant’s danger or 
blameworthiness, courts can and do vary downward. But that 
is up to their sound discretion. 
II. THOUGH COURTS NEED NOT REDO RANGES, THEY 
HAVE DISCRETION TO CONSIDER UPDATED GUIDELINES 
The First Step Act and § 3553 neither require recalculating 
ranges from scratch nor forbid it. Congress did not draft the 
Act “on a blank slate.” Easter, 975 F.3d at 324 (quoting United 
States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)). It 
expected courts to exercise broad sentencing discretion. Con-
gress told courts not that they must reduce sentences, but that 
they “may” do so. § 404(b). The Act set no limits on what 
courts can consider in exercising that discretion, only what 
they must. 
Faced with a First Step Act motion, the court starts with the 
defendant’s Guidelines range, updated “as if” the new statutory 
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punishments were in place back then. § 404(b). That range an-
chors the court’s discretion but does not limit it. Then, the court 
must look holistically at the whole case, including the defend-
ant and his crime. Easter, 975 F.3d at 326–27. In exercising its 
discretion to vary downwards, it can consider new facts and 
new law. 
The District Court did just that here. It started with Mur-
phy’s original range, amended only to reflect the new statutory 
punishments. Then, doubtful that he would be a career offender 
if sentenced today, it exercised its discretion to vary down-
wards. In doing so, the court followed the law. 
III. EASTER IS NOT ON POINT 
Finally, the Majority insists that Easter requires this new 
Guidelines calculation. Maj. Op. 11, 18. It does not. 
Easter dealt with a different issue. There, the district court 
refused to consider the defendant’s rehabilitation in prison. 975 
F.3d at 322. We held that it must. Id. at 323. When deciding 
whether to reduce a sentence, district courts must consider all 
the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Id. Easter did not involve any 
changed Guidelines or case law. The parties neither briefed nor 
argued about redoing the Guidelines range to reflect new law. 
So we had no occasion to consider that issue. Easter does not 
control this case; the Act’s text does. 
* * * * * 
The First Step Act requires a sentencing court to update one 
law but lets it consider others. The District Court saw that dis-
cretion and exercised it here, giving Murphy a break. Even so, 
5 
the Majority vacates and remands, requiring it to redo the 
Guidelines range to account for every new law. Because that 
approach misreads the Act, upsets finality, and puts us on the 
wrong side of a three-way circuit split, I respectfully dissent. 
